A recent appeal by U.S. lawmakers urging the War Department to expand its list of Chinese military-linked entities marks a critical moment in America’s ongoing reassessment of technological risk. The request, which names some of China’s most globally recognizable companies, reflects growing concern that commercial technology firms are no longer clearly separable from military power projection, internal security operations, and strategic competition. For the United States, the issue is not merely regulatory or political. It is about understanding how advanced technologies developed under China’s system can translate into long-term security challenges for Americans.
The lawmakers’ letter highlights a broad set of Chinese firms spanning artificial intelligence, consumer electronics, biotechnology, semiconductors, batteries, robotics, and advanced manufacturing. The concern is not limited to any single product or industry. Instead, it reflects an increasingly accepted reality that China’s civil-military fusion framework blurs distinctions between private enterprise and state objectives. Under this model, innovations developed for civilian markets can be rapidly adapted for military, surveillance, or intelligence use, often without the transparency expected in open economies.
From an American perspective, this matters because technology supply chains are deeply intertwined. Smartphones, cloud services, electric vehicles, medical research tools, and AI software are embedded in daily life, critical infrastructure, and defense-adjacent industries. When firms operating at this scale maintain ties to the People’s Liberation Army, even indirectly, it creates potential pathways for influence, data exposure, and strategic leverage that extend far beyond traditional military confrontation.
Artificial intelligence sits at the center of these concerns. According to information cited by lawmakers, AI models developed by Chinese firms have been procured by PLA-linked entities and integrated into domestic policing and surveillance systems. These systems reportedly analyze faces, vehicles, and crowd behavior, while assisting law enforcement decision-making at scale. For Americans, the relevance is not hypothetical. AI techniques refined in domestic surveillance environments can later be adapted for foreign intelligence gathering, cyber operations, and battlefield decision support. Technological capability does not remain geographically confined, especially when it is developed by globally connected companies.
The proposed listings also underscore concerns around dual-use technologies. Robotics, sensors, batteries, semiconductors, and advanced manufacturing equipment are essential to modern economies, but they are equally vital to military logistics, autonomous systems, and weapons development. When companies involved in these sectors operate within an ecosystem where cooperation with military research institutions is normalized or required, risk assessment becomes a matter of structural reality rather than intent.
Importantly, this debate is not about vilifying innovation or isolating global markets. It is about recognizing how China’s governance system alters the risk profile of its major technology firms. In countries with strong legal separation between civilian industry and military institutions, oversight mechanisms and independent courts can limit the repurposing of commercial technology for coercive use. In China, the legal and political environment explicitly encourages alignment with state security goals. This systemic difference is what gives rise to concern, not the mere existence of advanced technology.
For the United States, the potential harm lies in unintended dependency. American businesses, research institutions, and consumers have benefited from globalized supply chains and competitive pricing. However, reliance on companies that may be compelled to support foreign military objectives introduces vulnerabilities that are difficult to quantify but costly to ignore. Data security, intellectual property protection, and infrastructure resilience all become harder to guarantee when upstream technologies originate in environments where transparency is limited.
The lawmakers’ push to expand the military entity list reflects a desire to prevent U.S. government resources from indirectly supporting such risks. The original purpose of the list, established under previous defense authorization frameworks, was to ensure that federal contracts, investments, and partnerships do not inadvertently bolster adversarial military capabilities. Expanding that list in light of new information is a continuation of that preventive logic, rather than a departure from it.
At the same time, the breadth of companies mentioned highlights how deeply embedded Chinese firms have become in global markets. Names associated with smartphones, e-commerce, cloud computing, electric vehicles, and life sciences are familiar to American consumers and businesses. This familiarity can create a false sense of neutrality. Brand recognition does not equate to strategic independence, particularly when corporate governance is shaped by political obligations that differ fundamentally from those in democratic societies.
The biotechnology sector illustrates this complexity. Advanced genomics, pharmaceutical research, and medical data processing offer enormous benefits to human health. Yet they also involve sensitive biological data, manufacturing capabilities, and research insights that could be repurposed for military medicine or biosecurity applications. When companies operating in this space are linked to state security systems, the question becomes not whether harm is intended, but whether safeguards are sufficient to prevent misuse.
Similarly, electric vehicle and battery technologies have implications far beyond transportation. Energy storage, supply chain control over critical minerals, and advanced battery chemistry all factor into military logistics and strategic resilience. The same technologies that power civilian fleets can support unmanned systems, mobile command centers, and energy-independent operations. From a U.S. security standpoint, awareness of these overlaps is essential.
What makes the current moment particularly significant is the convergence of scale and speed. Technological development cycles are shortening, while deployment across civilian and military domains is accelerating. Decisions made today about partnerships, procurement, and investment can have lasting consequences that are difficult to reverse. The lawmakers’ letter reflects an attempt to slow down risk accumulation before it becomes entrenched.
For American citizens, vigilance does not require fear or hostility. It requires informed awareness. Understanding how global technology ecosystems operate, and how different political systems shape corporate behavior, is key to protecting long-term interests. National security in the modern era is not solely about borders and weapons. It is about data flows, manufacturing capacity, research collaboration, and the governance structures that guide them.
The challenge for the United States is to maintain openness while safeguarding resilience. This means encouraging innovation, protecting fair competition, and remaining engaged globally, while also setting clear boundaries where strategic risk becomes unacceptable. Tools like the military entity list are not ends in themselves. They are instruments designed to support informed decision-making and reduce exposure to hidden vulnerabilities.
China’s technological rise is a defining feature of the 21st century. How that rise intersects with military power, surveillance capacity, and global influence will shape the security environment for decades. The lawmakers’ request to expand scrutiny of Chinese tech firms is a signal that the United States is increasingly aware of these intersections. For Americans, paying attention to these developments is not about politics. It is about recognizing that the technologies shaping everyday life are also shaping the strategic balance of power.
As technology continues to redefine security, the United States faces a choice between passive reliance and active assessment. The current debate suggests a growing consensus that awareness and caution are not signs of weakness, but of strategic maturity. In an interconnected world, understanding where technology comes from, how it is governed, and where it ultimately serves is essential to protecting both prosperity and security at home.
